Surgical Prophylactics for Ovarian Cancer (SPOC): An Ethical Inquiry by Tuohey, John F.
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 65 | Number 3 Article 8
August 1998
Surgical Prophylactics for Ovarian Cancer
(SPOC): An Ethical Inquiry
John F. Tuohey
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Tuohey, John F. (1998) "Surgical Prophylactics for Ovarian Cancer (SPOC): An Ethical Inquiry," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 65: No. 3,
Article 8.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol65/iss3/8
Surgical Prophylactics for 
Ovarian Cancer (SPOC): 
An Ethical Inquiry 
by 
The Rev. John F. Tuohey, Ph.D. 
The author is presently ethicist for Mercy Health System, Oklahoma 
City. He has held numerous posts on the faculty of the Catholic 
University of America and is the author of Caring for Persons with 
AIDS and Cancer: Ethical Reflections on Palliative Care for the 
Tenninally Ill. 
During the 1950's, the principle of Totality emerged as an important 
tool in medical ethics for evaluating the appropriateness of surgical 
mutilation. One of the early issues ethicists used the principle to 
address was prophylactic surgery, usually elective tonsillectomies 
and elective or incidental appendectomies. An ethical consensus 
emerged that, while neither an elective tonsillectomy nor an elective 
appendectomy was justified, an incidental appendectomy was 
pennissible. A directive allowing the latter can be found in the 1954 
Code of Medical Ethics for Catholic Hospitals, I the forerunner of the 
present day Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Services. Since that time, discussions of prophylactic surgery have 
all but disappeared from the ethical literature, and no subsequent 
editions of the ERD contain any directive on the topic. Today, the 
issue of prophylactic surgery is once again emerging as a topic 
among ethicists and medical staff. The discovery that female carriers 
of BRCAJ and BRCA2 genn-line mutation may be at greater risk for 
breast and ovarian cancer2 has some physicians and women 
questioning whether prophylactic surgery to reduce that risk, 
specifically a mastectomy or a tubal ligation, can be ethically 
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appropriate. This is especially true with ovarian cancer due to the 
minimal mutilation entailed with a tubal ligation as compared to the 
mastectomy to reduce the risk of breast cancer. Both research and 
strong anecdotal evidence suggest that a tubal ligation may 
significantly reduce the risk of ovarian cancer by preventing 
exposure of the epithelium to steroid-rich follicular fluid and 
reducing circulating levels of pituitary gonadotropins. 3 
The connection between ovarian cancer and a surgical 
prophylactic for ovarian cancer, what I will refer to throughout as 
SPOC, is significant. Approximately 2% of all women will be 
diagnosed with ovarian cancer in their lifetime. Although less 
common than some other forms of cancer in women, 4 ovarian 
cancer is a particularly dangerous form. 5 Less than 40% of those 
women diagnosed with it will survive five years after that diagnosis.6 
There are approximately 120,000 deaths related to ovarian cancer 
each year. To emphasize the seriousness of this disease, 20,000 
people die each year from the flu, a figure that constitutes a health 
epidemic. In addition to the morbidity related to the disease, there 
are serious issues related to its treatment. Despite a variety of 
interventions for ovarian cancer, none has been shown to be 
singularly effective. In addition to their unproved effectiveness, each 
treatment entails its own morbidity.7 
Clearly, ovarian cancer poses a serious health risk to all 
women, and especially those who are carriers of BRCAl and BRCA2 
germ-line mutation. The ability to reduce the risk of this difficult 
and dangerous cancer with prophylactic surgery will have a 
profoundly beneficial impact on the lives of many women. 
There are essentially two ethical issues related to SPOC that 
emerge within the Catholic tradition that must be addressed. First, 
SPOC entails surgical mutilation. It must, therefore, be justified 
according to the conditions ofthe principle of Totality. As suggested 
above, however, there is not a great deal of literature discussing 
Totality and prophylactic surgery, and this is limited to 
tonsillectomies and appendectomies. This may be due to the fact 
that there have been relatively few opportunities when surgery was 
of prophylactic value as compared to its use for therapeutic or 
diagnostic use. Further, recent literature on Totality has tended to 
focus on theoretical questions, such as what Pius XII meant by the 
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concept of the total good of the person, or the correct interpretation 
of ST II-II q. 65, a. 1, rather than on its application to specific 
surgical interventions.8 To ask whether SPOC is permissible 
according to Totality is, in many ways, to raise a new ethical 
question. 
Second, SPOC entails the ligation of the fallopian tube. 
SPOC not only prevents exposure of the epithelium to steroid-rich 
follicular fluid and reduces circulating levels of pituitary 
gonadotropins. It also results in the obstruction of that sperm and 
ovum transport necessary for fertilization. As a sterilizing 
procedure, SPOC cannot be justified simply on the basis of the total 
good of the person. Direct sterilization, even for the health and well-
being of the individual, cannot be licitly performed in a Catholic 
health care facility.9 SPOC interventions will only be permissible if 
the sterilization is an unintended effect of a licit medical procedure. 
It is therefore necessary that the conditions of Double Effect be met 
before SPOC can be judged as a permissible medical procedure. 
Given these ethical concerns, the place of SPOC within 
Catholic health care is at best uncertain. The risks and dangers of 
ovarian cancer and its treatment as well as the reported reduction in 
risk through SPOC suggest, however, that its place be investigated. 
Is it permissible to perform the procedure in a Catholic health care 
facility? Maya Catholic physician perform SPOC? Maya Catholic 
woman request SPOC? Mayan IRB at a Catholic health care 
institution approve a SPOC protocol? It is the purpose of this work 
to investigate these questions by examining the procedure within the 
context of both the principles of Totality and Double Effect. This 
will be followed by concluding remarks intended to invite further 
debate. It is my hope that, as with past questions of prophylactic 
surgery, a consensus may begin to emerge as to the place of SPOC 
within the Catholic health care tradition. 
SPOC and the Principle of Totality 
The principle of Totality has become such a part of medical 
ethics that it is rarely discussed in contemporary literature to the 
degree that it was earlier in the tradition. Summary statements with a 
brief history are common today, and deemed sufficient. 1o This is 
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understandable. As principles become better understood there is less 
controversy in their application and less need for discussion. SPOC, 
however, entails at least four issues that may suggest controversy: 
(1) the mutilation is for a prophylactic, rather than curative, purpose, 
(2) it will be difficult to detennine that the good end is 
commensurate to the mutilation required to achieve it, and, finally, 
SPOC involves a (3) healthy and (4) reproductive organ. Each of 
these potential difficulties will be addressed here. 
Before doing so, a brief word should be said about Totality in 
general. The principle of Totality, rooted in the work of Aquinas ll , 
has come to be understood within the tradition as meaning that true 
bodily "parts" exist not for themselves, but for the sake of the whole. 
As a result, bodily "parts", meaning those organs that do not have 
ends outside the whole - seemingly excluding the reproductive 
organs - may be sacrificed for the sake of the whole when there is a 
proportionately grave or commensurate reason for doing so. That is, 
there must be a sufficiently grave threat to the person such that a 
commensurate relationshir exists between the good to be gained and 
the mutilation caused. I One important contributor to the 
development of the principle within the tradition, Gerald Kelly, S.1. , 
elaborates on this point. Kelly makes it clear that the degree of 
mutilation entailed in surgery is not a decisive element in decision 
making. As long as there is a commensurate relationship between 
the mutilation and the good end, the degree of mutilation may be 
great or slight. What is critical in moral evaluation is the presence of 
a proportionately grave reason for inflicting the mutilation. 13 This is 
important to keep in mind. The central ethical element of Totality is 
the judgment that the mutilation is commensurate to the good end to 
be achieved. Generally, this judgment requires an examination of 
the threat to the whole person and the degree and effect of the 
mutilation required to respond to this threat. 
(1.) Prophylactic Mutilation 
In addressing the first issue, it needs to be made explicit that 
surgical mutilation is not limited to those cases where it will serve to 
cure or manage a present pathology. Totality has also been used to 
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r justifY non-therapeutic physical mutilation such as that found in 
, experimentation l4, and, important for this discussion, as a 
prophylactic against some possible future disease. Explicitly 
referring to prophylactic mutilation, Pius XII stated: 
Because he is not a user and not a proprietor, an individual does 
not have unlimited power to destroy or mutilate his body or its 
functions. Nevertheless, by virtue of the principle of totality and 
the right to use the services of the organism as a whole, each 
person can permit individual parts to be destroyed or mutilated 
when the good of the whole requires it. Further, he may do so to 
the extent necessary. This may be done to ensure life, as well as 
to avoid or, naturally, repair serious and lasting damage that 
cannot otherwise be avoided or repaired. 15 
(Emphasis added) 
Ethical discussion of prophylactic surgery, some of which 
will be cited here, shows clearly that the phrases "to ensure" (pour 
assurer) and "to avoid" (pour eviler), are understood to refer to 
prophylactic mutilation in the strict sense. Acceptance of certain 
clinical practices also points to this fact. Immunization is a common 
example of a prophylactic mutilation held to be commensurate to a 
good end. The removal of adenoids during a tonsillectomy or the 
removal of an appendix during abdominal surgery are other, less 
common instances of a surgical prophylactic that have been justified 
using Totality. In some medical interventions, the mutilation 
entailed is easily regarded as commensurate to the good end. In the 
absence of actual harm, however, it can be difficult to determine 
whether a proportionately grave reason exists to perform the surgery. 
Nevertheless, such mutilation is allowed by Totality when there is a 
proportionately grave reason. 
(2.) Determining Commensurate Reason 
There is always a degree of uncertainty in making the 
jUdgment of commensurate reason when using the principle of 
Totality. An elderly person with multiple and serious health 
difficulties may judge that the amputation of a leg is not 
commensurate to the prevention of gangrene poisoning, whereas a 
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younger person in otherwise good health may judge the loss of a 
limb as commensurate. In certain circumstances, either of these 
judgments could change. The judgment of commensurate reason is 
not always self-evident, nor universally agreed upon. This is 
especially true in cases of prophylactic surgery when one must take 
into account not only the seriousness of the pathology, but also the 
degree of probability or likelihood that the pathology will come to 
pass. 
One excellent example of the ambiguity in making this 
judgment concerns the question of a prophylactic tonsillectomy. 
Charles McFadden, O.S.A., wrote, "it is evident that ordinarily there 
is no moral justification for the removal of healthy tonsils." 16 The 
reason, he explained, is because their removal in a moment of 
pathological crisis is · relatively simple. However, there might be 
situations in which one could justify their prophylactic removal in 
light of the fact that a tonsillectomy entails only minimal risk to the 
patient. He gives the example of a poor family of five children who 
is moving to a new state, and a physician who is willing to perform 
the procedure free of charge before they move, in anticipation of the 
possibility of incurring the expense later. Others objected to this 
conclusion. Kelly is one example, maintaining that because the 
tonsils are easily removed when necessary, removing them without 
medical indication "creates risk without proportionate cause." 17 
This lack of certainty does not mean that Totality cannot 
allow mutilation, either for cure or for prophylaxis. Commensurate 
reason need not be immediately self-evident or certain. To make 
these types of judgments, the tradition relies on probable certitude. 18 
Probable certitude simply means that it is reasonable to make the 
judgment that there is a commensurate relationship between the good 
end and the surgical mutilation. 19 This is true even if another 
reasonably judges otherwise?O Probable certitude rooted in a 
reasonable judgement that the good outweighs the harm is sufficient 
within the moral tradition to allow surgical mutilation. This point is 
illustrated clearly by the lack of precise analysis in the literature 
discussing prophylactic mutilations.21 The determination of 
commensurate reason is one that conforms to a reasonable judgment, 
not a precise methodology.22 
It must be noted that as a consensus emerges regarding a 
82 Linacre Quarterly 
judgment of commensurate reason in specific situations, it can 
become difficult or even impossible to reasonably judge otherwise. 
This is what happened in the case of an elective tonsillectomy. A 
medical and ethical consensus emerged that it was not reasonable to 
judge that the procedure entailed a commensurate good. In the 
absence of such a consensus, however, all that the tradition requires 
in the application of totality is the reasonable judgment that a 
proportionally grave reason exists. 
(3.) Mutilation of Healthy Organs 
A third issue concerns the mutilation of healthy organs. 
Totality does not restrict mutilation to unhealthy organs, or to organs 
that are in immediate danger of becoming pathological. Healthy 
organs may be mutilated for the good of the whole whenever their 
functioning poses a physical risk to the person. In a 1953 address, 
Pius XII stated that the decisive element of Totality was not that the 
organ which is removed or rendered nonfunctional is itself diseased. 
Rather, the decisive element is that the preservation of that organ or 
its functioning poses a direct or indirect threat to the body as a 
whole.23 When, by its function, a healthy organ exercises a harmful 
effect on the body and the removal of that organ or the suppression 
of its function may prove to be of benefit, that organ may be 
removed or rendered nonfunctional. This applies, and here the 
fourth issue is addressed, to the reproductive organs as well. 
(4.) The Mutilation of Reproductive Organs 
Direct sterilization is prohibited within the tradition. This is 
because only those organs which do not have an end outside the 
whole person may be mutilated for the sake of the person. The 
reproductive organs are not understood to function for the direct, 
physical well being of the person, but rather for the end of 
procreating another being. They therefore cannot, as seen above, 
generally be mutilated for the good of the whole. This does not 
mean that they may never be mutilated for the sake of the whole. 
Reproductive organs may be mutilated for the sake of the whole 
person as long as it is the general biological functioning of those 
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organs which affects or threatens the whole, and not their 
reproductive functioning. 
For example, the tradition holds that healthy testicles may be 
removed if the production of testosterone poses a health risk to a 
man with cancer.24 The production of testosterone is necessary for 
procreation, but in this case it is the testosterone by itself, apart from 
its reproductive role, which poses a threat to the person. On the 
other hand, if pregnancy were to pose a health risk to a woman with 
hypertension, it would not be permitted to mutilate the reproductive 
system. In this latter case, it is pregnancy, the reproductive 
functioning of the reproductive organs, that poses a health threat.25 
Totality and SPOC 
Is it possible to make the reasonable judgment that, in light of 
the degree of risk and morbidity associated with ovarian cancer and 
its management, and the degree of mutilation entailed in SPOC, there 
can be a commensurate reason to permit the procedure according to 
Totality? Is it possible that both a medical and ethical consensus 
may emerge that such is the case? The consensus that has emerged 
within the tradition regarding an incidental appendectomy offers a 
helpful analogy. 
Kelly offered what became the standard use of Totality for a 
discussion of the appropriateness of the incidental appendectomy. 
He asserted that, (a) when the abdomen was open for some other 
legitimate reason, (b) because the appendix served no significant role 
in the functional integrity of the body, and (c) if the appendectomy 
would not increase the risk of the operation or add a notable 
inconvenience in convalescence, "there is no moral objection to 
incidental appendectomy,,26 Using similar arguments, Thomas 
O'Donnell agreed?7 It should be pointed out that in stating his 
conclusion, Kelly does not require that the appendix be pathological. 
In fact, he explicitly rejected the argument of Nicholas Lohkamp 
that a purely prophylactic surgery was never permissible. Lohkamp 
stated that there must be at least the probability that the pathology is 
already present in some latent or potential way for the incidental 
appendectomy to be permissible.28 Kelly comments that this is an 
interesting theory, and acknowledges that "[i]t may well be that most 
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apparently healthy appendices are already somewhat diseased." But, 
"this is not a requisite either morally or medically, for justifying 
incidental appendectomy.,,29 According to the tradition, it is 
sufficient that there be merely a risk to the health of the person, a risk 
which he does not specify beyond the acknowledging that "this is 
fairly routine practice in good hospitals. ,,30 All that is necessary to 
justify prophylactic surgery according to Totality is the reasonable 
judgment that the risks of the procedure, the importance of the organ 
and the mutilation and physical loss entailed are commensurate to 
the elimination of risk. 
Kelly incorporated this conclusion in his Code of Medical 
Ethics, written on behalf of the Catholic Hospital Association. It can 
also be found in his Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Hospitals (Directive 41), approved by the Bishops of the United 
States "as the official medical code subject to the approval of the 
authorities for use in their dioceses.,,31 This directive was deleted 
during draft revisions to the ERD in 1970, and is not found in the 
final edition that was approved in 1971. Similarly, it is not found in 
the recently promulgated 1994 edition. I have been unable to 
determine the exact circumstances of the deletion. It appears, 
though, that there is no ethical discussion of the incidental 
appendectomy in the literature appearing after the time of the 
publication of Kelly's Medico Moral Problems. This may be seen as 
indicative of a consensus of ethical agreement that the performance 
of an incidental appendectomy, and the rationale to explain it, is 
consistent with the tradition's understanding of Totality.32 
From the above, I believe it can be confidently concluded that 
the tradition's use of Totality allows prophylactic surgery in those 
cases where there is a risk to the health of the person posed by the 
functioning of a healthy organ, and when it is reasonable to judge 
that there is a commensurability between the mutilation and the 
reduction or elimination of that risk. From this, I will propose that 
SPOC can be reasonably judged to be permissible in a way similar to 
the judgment that an incidental appendectomy is permissible. I will 
further suggest that, although a consensus exists that an elective 
appendectomy is not permissible, SPOC need not be restricted to 
being an incidental procedure. Ovarian cancer clearly poses a more 
significant health risk than appendicitis, even if the incidence is 
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lower. Approximately 7% of the population will experience an 
episode of acute appendicitis requiring an appendectomy. This 
compares to 2% of the female population being at risk with ovarian 
cancer. However, it must be kept in mind that appendicitis is 
generally completely resolved at the time of the episode. Ovarian 
cancer cannot be resolved at the time of diagnosis, and its 
management is uncertain and entails significant morbidity. Death 
and serious complications due to appendicitis are relatively 
uncommon, yet 60% of those diagnosed with ovarian cancer will die 
within four years of diagnosis. Also, SPOC, because it entails a 
relatively simple procedure involving the fallopian tubes, can be 
performed as an elective procedure as laparoscopic surgery under a 
general or local anesthesia, or incidentally as part of a cesarian or 
other abdominal surgery. This is not the case with a prophylactic 
appendectomy, which ethical consensus holds can only be justified 
when performed incidentally due to the risks entailed. The overall 
physical mutilation required for SPOC is smaller than that required 
by an appendectomy, and in some cases may be reversible. 
I will propose, then, that the mutilation and the reduction in 
risk provided by SPOC with the incidence of ovarian cancer and its 
attendant morbidity, as well as the morbidity of its treatment makes 
it reasonable to conclude that SPOC can be justified according to 
Totality. It still remains, however, to address the . issue of 
sterilization as an effect of SPOC. This will be done through a 
discussion of the four conditions of the Principle of Double Effect. 
SPOC and the Principle of Double Effect33 
The first condition of the PDE holds that the end or purpose 
of the procedure must be good. Here, there is no ethical difficulty 
with intending the preservation of a woman's health as an end. The 
tradition has long held that the health and well-being of the person is 
a good end that may be intended as an end. Indeed, right 
stewardship over the body requires one to intend health and well-
being as an end.34 
The second condition holds that the procedure must be 
morally good or indifferent. To determine this, it is necessary to 
specify the moral object of the procedure. In doing so, it should be 
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noted that there are two immediate effects of SPOC. One effect is 
the prevention of exposure by the epithelium to steroid-rich follicular 
fluid and the reduction of circulating levels of pituitary 
gonadotropins. A second effect is the prevention of sperm and ovum 
transport through the fallopian tube. These are two distinct 
biological effects that are related to each other by the fact that each 
requires a patent fallopian tube. The fallopian tube serves as a 
transport medium in two different and distinct biological events,35 
and hence its mutilation will result in two distinct biological effects. 
It is the first effect that reduces the risk of ovarian cancer. It is 
therefore this effect which lies within the intention (ex intentione) as 
the moral object of SPOC. Sterilization is not the sole immediate 
effect of SPoc. It is a second effect which, when SPOC is 
performed as a prophylactic against ovarian cancer, lies outside the 
intention (praeter intentionem). Performed for the purpose of 
preventing ovarian cancer, SPOC can rightly be said to have a 
morally good or at least neutral object, and hence is a morally 
permissible procedure. 
The third condition holds that the good effect must not flow 
from the evil effect. Although similar, this condition is distinct from 
the second. Even if the procedure is good in itself, it is important to 
determine that the evil effect of that procedure is not the means to a 
good end. As already noted in the above discussion of the second 
condition, both effects flow immediately from the procedure and 
independently of each other. This biological independence 
demonstrates that sterilization is neither the object of the act nor the 
cause or means of the good end. Stated differently, the effect of 
sterilization is not a means for which SPOC is performed. It is an 
effect in spite of which SPOC is performed. Preventing pregnancy 
will not reduce the risk of ovarian cancer.36 
The fourth condition requires that there be a commensurate 
reason for causing the unintended effect of a good act. It is one thing 
to say that the mutilation entailed in SPOC is commensurate to the 
prevention of ovarian cancer. It must still be determined that this 
good end is commensurate to the effect of sterilization. Not only 
must there be a commensurate reason to mutilate the fallopian tube. 
There must also be a commensurate reason for bringing about the 
unintended sterilization. 
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Health and well-being have consistently been understood 
within the tradition as being commensurate to the mutilation of the 
reproductive faculty when pathology is present.37 A caution must be 
raised here, however, because SPOC pertains to a situation in which 
there is no pathology present. Instead, it is the risk of a pathology 
that is of concern. Given the fact that ovarian cancer is a particularly 
dangerous form of cancer responsible for 120,000 deaths each year, 
however, it is possible to propose that sterilization as an effect of 
preventing a pathology may be understood to be analogous to the 
sterilization that results from treating a pathology. I propose that it is 
reasonable to conclude that the good end of significantly reducing 
the risk of a pathology like ovarian cancer is commensurate to the 
unintended effect of sterilization. There is no certain answer in this 
case. There is seldom absolute certainty in making a judgment 
regarding the presence of commensurate reason in this fourth 
condition of PDE, just as there is often a lack of absolute certitude in 
making a judgment of commensurate reason with Totality. Still, the 
prudent person, weighing the facts of the case, might conclude that it 
is reasonable to judge that a commensurate reason exists for causing 
sterilization in a prophylactic procedure such as SPOC. The 
reasonableness of this judgment can be strengthened if the moral 
significance of that effect is lessened. The possibility of this is 
rooted in the Church's teachings on Natural Family Planning. 
The moral tradition has understood that there are legitimate 
motives for a decision to positively exclude the good of procreation 
from the conjugal relationship. Among these are reasons of health, 
the desire to avoid passing on a genetic anomaly, economic 
considerations and social mission. When conditions such as these 
are present, a couple may limit the number of children they will bear 
as long as in doing so they do not directly intend to impede the 
procreative end of the sexual act.38 When there are serious reasons 
for positively excluding the procreative end from the sexual act, the 
unintended loss of the reproductive function resulting from a medical 
intervention directed toward some disease may be more readily 
judged as being commensurate to a good end. That is, if a couple 
makes a positive decision not to bear children, and this decision is 
made with an honorable motive, the unintended loss of fertility that 
results from some medical procedure either person might have is less 
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grave from a moral perspective than if the couple simply did not 
want any children in the first place. In both cases the loss of fertility 
may be unintended, but the commensurate reason for allowing that 
unintended effect is different. An example can be found going back 
to Pius XII's justification of castration in the case of cancer.39 In the 
case of a man who, with his wife, has determined not to bear further 
children due to the presence of a genetic anomaly, the loss of the 
reproductive function due to castration is less morally grave and thus 
more readily justified than in the case of a man who has no reason 
not to procreate and most likely would procreate were it not for the 
unintended effect of the castration. This is perhaps not the best 
example, for in both cases the unintended loss of fertility is justified. 
Nevertheless, the point should be clear that the moral justification in 
both cases is different. Perhaps a better but admittedly self-serving 
example is SPOC itself. For a woman who will no longer bear 
children due to age or health, the loss of fertility is more readily 
justified than for a young woman who has not borne any children and 
who has no particular reason why she would not have any. In this 
case, the risk of ovarian cancer is such that it would be difficult to 
see how the unintended loss of fertility could be justified as being 
commensurate to the good end 
Conclusion 
SPOC, performed for the good end of health, has as its moral 
object the prevention of exposure of the epithelium to steroid-rich 
follicular fluid and the reduction of circulating levels of pituitary 
gonadotropins. Sterilization results as an unintended effect that is 
not the cause of the good end. As such, SPOC meets the first three 
conditions of Double Effect and may be described as a permissible 
prophylactic surgical intervention. Before SPOC may be performed 
in any given case, however, both the requirements of Totality and the 
fourth condition of PDE must be satisfied . . It must be reasonable to 
judge that both the mutilation entailed and the effect of sterilization 
that results are commensurate to the good end of significantly 
reducing the risk of a dangerous cancer. 
With regard to commensurate reason and Totality, I propose 
that the incidence and morbidity of ovarian cancer and its 
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management, seen within the context of the significant reduction in 
risk, make it reasonable to conclude that the minor mutilation 
involved in SPOC is commensurate. The use of surgery as a 
prophylactic against ovarian cancer may be said to be justified by 
Totality. This is especially true when SPOC is perfonned as an 
incidental rather than · elective procedure. In light of the · 
comparatively less mutilation entailed in SPOC as compared to an 
appendectomy and the fact that SPOC can be done as a laparoscopic 
procedure in an outpatient setting, this restriction to incidental use 
may not be necessary with SPOC. Some will disagree with the 
reasonableness of either or both of these judgments. In the absence 
of a consensus, which this work seeks to help shape, it is 
nevertheless possible to hold that this conclusion is probable 
With regard to the fourth condition of the PDE, the tradition 
would generally hold that the good end of health is commensurate to 
the unintended effect of sterilization. This is especially the case 
when there is some reason, such as those articulated by Pius XII, 
which allows a couple to positively exclude the procreative good. 
Hence, it seems reasonable to judge that the loss of fertility entailed 
in SPOC is allowed for a commensurate reason. The reasonableness 
of this conclusion can be strengthened in those instances when the 
moral significance of the loss of fertility is mitigated by some serious 
reason. This would not appear to be a necessary restriction, but 
rather a prudent application in light of the fact that the procedure is 
prophylactic rather than curative. 
I will tentatively conclude here that SPOC is not in any way 
prohibited by the tradition as a whole, or by any specific directive of 
the ERD.40 It would seem that SPOC may be perfonned in a 
Catholic facility as part of a research protocol to confinn its 
prophylactic value, or simply at the request of a patient. Similarly, a 
Catholic woman is free to request SPOC of her physician, and a 
Catholic physician or nurse is free to perfonn or assist in SPOC in a 
non-Catholic facility. In light of the fact that the judgment regarding 
a commensurate reason in both Totality and the fourth condition of 
the PDE is fonned with probable certitude for which a consensus 
does not yet exist, hospital policies may want to limit the general use 
of SPOC to situations wherein it can be perfonned concurrent with 
an otherwise medically indicated surgical procedure, and when there 
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is some reason to avoid future procreation. Nevertheless, policies 
should not be closed to the possibility that in some hospital settings 
and under some circumstances SP~C can be permissible outside the 
context of some other surgery or serious reason to exclude 
procreation. Using Kelly's expression regarding elective 
appendectomies, there can be special cases in which this use of 
sP~c would seem probable.41 These can be addressed on a case by 
case basis until such time as a consensus begins to emerge regarding 
this judgment. 
This conclusion is based on what appear to this author to be 
reasonable judgments of what constitutes a commensurate reason for 
performing SP~C. The reasonableness of this judgment depends on 
both ethical and medical information. It is necessary, as ethicists 
seek to build a consensus, that policies that allow SP~C and 
decisions of conscience which inform individuals' behaviors be 
continually reviewed. Medical information may come to light that 
challenges or strengthens the judgments put forth here. It must be 
kept in mind that changes in the medical information may make 
SP~C more easily justified, less easily justified, or even prohibited.42 
In the meantime, it seems reasonable to conclude that SP~C is a 
generally permissible prophylactic procedure for ovarian cancer. I 
invite other ethicists to join me in this discussion so that a clearer 
consensus may emerge in a manner similar to the consensus that now 
informs Catholic health care's acceptance of the incidental 
appendectomy. 
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